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**Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their
implications for international peace, security
and development**

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

**Letter dated 30 August 2013 from the Permanent Representative
of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General**

In accordance with instructions received from the Government of the Republic of Azerbaijan, I have the honour to draw your attention to ongoing violations of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia recorded for May 2013. As is seen from the annexed information, during the reporting period, the armed forces of Armenia continued intensive fire from their positions in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan and from the territory of Armenia (see annex). As a result, one serviceman of the armed forces of Azerbaijan was killed and another one wounded.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 34 and 39, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Agshin Mehdiyev
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex to the letter dated 30 August 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violation of the ceasefire by the armed forces of the Republic of Armenia* for May 2013

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
1	1 May	0140-0155	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
2		0320-0322	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
3		0340-0350	Kengerli village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
4		0415-0420	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
5		0810-0815	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
6		1750-1800	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
7		1830-1840	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
8		1950-2000	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle, DShK heavy machine gun	—
9		2030-2040	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzykhajly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
10	2 May	0120-0130	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—

* Settlements of the Republic of Azerbaijan included in this information are under occupation by the Republic of Armenia or situated close to the fire point areas.

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
11		0125-0140	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
12		0130-0145	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
13		0200-0215	Saryjaly and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
14		0530-0540	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
15		0530-0540	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
16		1745-1800	Voskevan village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Gushchu Ayrum village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
17		1930-2015	Orjenekidze village (Krasnoselsk district, Armenia) and Galakend village (Gedabey district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle, DShK heavy machine gun	—
18		2350-0010	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
19	3 May	0020-0025	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	—
20		0310-0325	Novruzlu village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
21		0330-0350	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
22		0335-0345	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
23		0345-0355	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
24		1920-1925	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
25		2200-2210	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
26		2240-2250	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
27		2255-2305	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
28		2315-2320	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
29		2325-2330	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
30		2325-2330	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
31		2340-2355	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
32	4 May	0210-0220	Garagashly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
33		0220-0230	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
34		0415-0420	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
35		0930-0940	Javahirli and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—

<i>No.</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Time</i>	<i>Direction (locality)</i>	<i>Weapons used</i>	<i>Casualties and damages</i>
36		1300-1330	Orjenekidze village (Krasnoselsk district, Armenia) and Galakend village (Gedabey district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
37		2315-2320	Shuraabad and Tezekend villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
38	5 May	0005-0018	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
39		0030-0040	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM and AK-type assault rifles	—
40		0105-0110	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
41		0115-0120	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
42		0210-0215	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	—
43		2250-2300	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
44		2310-2340	Horadiz an' Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
45	6 May	0002-0010	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
46		0100-0110	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	—
47		0115-0120	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
48		0150-0200	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
49		0150-0200	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
50		0150-0200	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
51		0410-0420	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
52		2200-2210	Garagashly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
53		2205-2215	Shirvanly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
54		2215-2220	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
55		2330-2335	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	—
56		2345-0005	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
57	7 May	0005-0010	Garagashly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
58		0105-0120	Voskepar village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Ashaghy Eskipara village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
59		0250-0300	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
60		0350-0400	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
61		2000-2010	Kengerli village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
62		2130-2155	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
63	8 May	0040-0045	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
64		0045-0050	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
65		0200-0205	Kuropatkins village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
66		0215-0220	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
67		0230-0240	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzykhajly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
68		0240-0245	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
69		0715-0725	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
70		1730-1740	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	—
71		1825-1840	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
72		1855-1910	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
73		2155-2200	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
74		2205-2215	Javahirli and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
75		2210-2220	Yarymja and Tezekend villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM and AK-type assault rifles	—
76		2350-0000	Shuraabad and Tezekend villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
77	9 May	0015-0020	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
78		0120-0130	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
79		0130-0140	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzykhajly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
80		0140-0145	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
81		0145-0155	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzykhajly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
82		0350-0355	Saryjly and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	—
83		0415-0420	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
84		0425-0430	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
85		0820-0840	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	—
86		1715-1720	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
87		2130-2135	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle and AKM assault rifle	—
88		2140-2145	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	—
89		2145-2150	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
90		2155-2205	Tapgaragoyunlu village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	—
91		2200-2220	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
92		2205-2210	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
93		2210-2230	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
94	10 May	0000-0010	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
95		0020-0025	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
96		0040-0055	Garagashly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
97		0050-0055	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
98		0150-0200	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
99		0150-0205	Shirvanly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
100		0210-0210	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
101		0220-0230	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
102		0230-0235	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
103		0315-0320	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
104		0510-0525	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
105		2300-2320	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
106		2315-2340	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	—
107		2335-2350	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type and AKM assault rifles	—
108	11 May	0025-0045	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
109		0040-0055	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
110		0050-0105	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	—

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
111		0127-0140	Javahirli and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type and AKM assault rifles	—
112		0540-0600	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
113		0600-0615	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
114		0605-0625	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
115		1700-1720	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
116		2230-2232	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
117	12 May	0000-0010	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	—
118		0225-0230	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
119		0420-0450	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
120		0420-0450	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle and AKM assault rifle	—
121		2115-2125	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
122		2320-2340	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
123	13 May	0225-0228	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
124		0355-0400	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
125		2250-2305	Namirli village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
126		2300-2310	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
127	14 May	0000-0005	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzykhajly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type and AKM assault rifles	—
128		0005-0010	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and DShK heavy machine gun	—
129		0010-0020	Berkaber village (Ijevan district, Armenia) and Gyzykhajly village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
130		0350-0040	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and DShK heavy machine gun	—
131		1450-1455	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	—
132		2020-2040	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
133	15 May	0320-0330	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
134	16 May	0035-0045	Novruzlu village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
135		0155-0210	Saryjaly and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
136		0800-0805	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
137		1105-1115	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
138		1215-1220	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
139		1930-2000	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle and DShK heavy machine gun	—
140	17 May	0002-0005	Berdavan village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Kemerli village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
141		0150-0230	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
142		1055-1120	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	—
143		1210-1215	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
144		1310-1315	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
145		1425-1430	Mehdili and Jojug Marjanly villages (Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
146		1530-1545	Orjenekidze village (Krasnoselsk district, Armenia) and Galakend village (Gedabey district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
147		1855-1900	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
148	18 May	0100-0105	Ashaghy Veyselli village (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
149		0130-0140	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
150		0400-0405	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
151		0410-0420	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
152		0425-0430	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
153		0505-0510	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
154		0530-0535	Mehdili and Jojug Marjanly villages (Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
155		0530-0535	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
156	19 May	0015-0020	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
157		0030-0035	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
158		0100-0115	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
159		0110-0130	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
160		0245-0250	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
161		0440-0445	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
162		0435-0445	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
163		2200-2203	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
164	20 May	0040-0050	Kengerli village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
165		0120-0125	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
166		0130-0135	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	—
167		0305-0325	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type and AKM assault rifles	—
168	21 May	0045-0055	Berdavan village (Noyemberyan district, Armenia) and Kemerli village (Gazakh district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
169		0110-0125	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
170		0130-0140	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
171		0155-0210	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
172		0220-0225	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	—
173		2330-2335	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
174		2335-2350	Shirvanly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
175	22 May	0130-0145	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
176		0140-0145	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
177		0145-0150	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
178		0200-0230	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
179		1130-1140	Garagashly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
180		1250-1255	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	—
181		1450-1500	Orjenekidze village (Krasnoselsk district, Armenia) and Galakend village (Gedabey district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun and AKM assault rifle	—
182	23 May	0110-0120	Kengerli village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
183		0145-0150	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
184		0320-0325	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
185		0320-0325	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
186		1325-1350	Orjenekidze village (Krasnoselsk district, Armenia) and Galakend village (Gedabey district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun and AK-type assault rifle	—

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
187		1433-1445	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	—
188		1830-1840	Kengerli village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
189		1750-1800	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
190		1955-2000	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
191		2230-2245	Namirli village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
192		2300-2315	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
193		2310-2320	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
194	24 May	0150-0205	Garakhanbeyli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
195		0200-0210	Ashaghy Seyidahmedli and Alykhanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
196		0210-0215	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
197		0300-0310	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
198		0305-0315	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
199		0310-0315	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	—

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
200		1245-1250	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	DShK heavy machine gun	—
201		1450-1500	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
202		1550-1600	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
203		1828-1835	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
204		1650-1730	Orjenekidze village (Krasnoselsk district, Armenia) and Galakend village (Gedabey district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
205		1700-1730	Orjenekidze village (Krasnoselsk district, Armenia) and Galakend village (Gedabey district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
206	25 May	0500-0510	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
207		1450-1500	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
208		1455-1515	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
209		2132-2140	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
210	26 May	0045-0105	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
211		0230-0240	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	—

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
212		0430-0440	Garagashly and Chemenli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
213		1210-1215	Yusifjanly and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
214		2130-2135	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	—
215	27 May	0330-0340	Mehdili and Jojug Marjanly villages (Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
216		0435-0445	Javahirli and Garadaghly villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
217		0510-0515	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type and AKM assault rifles	—
218		2150-2200	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
219		1520	North-West of Jerabert village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	Assault rifle	A soldier of the armed forces of Azerbaijan was killed
220	28 May	1420-1500	Gulustan village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
221		1841-1900	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
222		2020-2040	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
223		2345-0000	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
224	29 May	0155-0200	Shykhlar and Bash Garvand villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
225		0520-0525	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	SVD sniper rifle	—
226		1210-1230	Yarymja and Tezekend villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
227		1235-1255	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
228		1225-1230	Kuropatkino village (Khojavand district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
229		1420-1427	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
230		1440-1505	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
231		1720-1735	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
232		1735-1740	Mehdili and Jojug Marjanly villages (Jabrayil district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
233		1820-1840	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle and RPQ-7 rocket propelled grenade	—
234		1823-1832	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
235		2310-2325	Talysh village (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan) and Chayly village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—

No.	Date	Time	Direction (locality)	Weapons used	Casualties and damages
236		1830	South-East of Jerabert village (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	RPG-7 rocket propelled grenade	A soldier of the armed forces of Azerbaijan was wounded
237	30 May	0100-0125	Jerabert and Karmiravan villages (Tartar district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
238		1115-1125	Orjenekidze village (Krasnoselsk district, Armenia) and Galakend village (Gedabey district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
239		1645-1655	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
240		2200-2205	Shuraabad and Tezekend villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AKM assault rifle	—
241		2350-0005	Talysh and Tapgaragoyunlu villages (Goranboy district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
242	31 May	0430-0500	Horadiz and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
243		0440-0450	Gorgan and Ashaghy Abdurrahmanly villages (Fizuli district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
244		0600-0610	Kengerli village (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
245		1010-1015	Merzili and Giyamaddinli villages (Aghdam district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—
246		1325-1340	Orjenekidze village (Krasnoselsk district, Armenia) and Galakend village (Gedabey district, Azerbaijan)	AK-type assault rifle	—

Abbreviations: AK/AKM, Kalashnikov rifle; PK, Kalashnikov machine gun; SVD, 7.9 mm sniper weapon; DShK, 12.7 mm machine gun.



**General Assembly
Security Council**

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**General Assembly
Sixty-seventh session
Agenda item 36
The situation in the Middle East**

**Security Council
Sixty-eighth year**

**Identical letters dated 4 September 2013 from the Permanent
Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council**

On instructions from my Government, I should like to inform you that, at around 1640 hours on 21 August 2013, in the locality of Malikiyya, 24 Israeli enemy soldiers crossed the technical fence and violated the Blue Line opposite the town of Aytarun, between points B56 and BP25, before leaving the area and returning into occupied territory at 1737 hours.

My Government considers this action to be a blatant violation of my country's sovereignty, and it must be condemned on the basis of the principles and provisions of international law and international norms.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 36, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nawaf Salam
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



**Security Council**

Distr.: General
4 September 2013

Original: English

**Letter dated 3 September 2013 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of
the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council**

I have the honour to convey to you, and through you to the esteemed members of the Security Council, the joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of the visit of Mr. Salva Kiir Myardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan, to the Sudan on 3 and 4 September 2013, at the invitation of Mr. Omer Hassan al-Bashir, President of the Republic of the Sudan (see annex). The visit took place in the context of the summit diplomacy to promote and foster relations between the two countries and address the pending issues between them.

Besides the meeting of the Presidents, a number of meetings were convened at the ministerial, technical and high official levels. They were convened in a positive environment leading to understandings that would, it is hoped, pave the way for the implementation of cooperation agreements, and the activation of the joint mechanisms, including the High-level Joint Committee, the Joint Implementation Committee and the mechanisms suggested by the Chairperson of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, Mr. Thabo Mbeki, regarding the identification of the zero line for the safe demilitarized border zone and ceasing support and harbouring of rebel movements, to enable the mechanisms to complete their mandate to provide security at the borders and establish corridors that would allow the smooth movements of people, goods and oil as well as the cross-border movement of pastoralists. The two sides also agreed to jointly address the international community, with the support of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, to exempt the Sudan's debts and support the development of the two countries.

The joint communiqué is self-explanatory, therefore I would be grateful if this letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Idris Ismail Faragalla Hassan
Chargé d'affaires a.i.



Annex to the letter dated 3 September 2013 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Sudan to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Joint communiqué on the visit of the President of the Republic of South Sudan to Khartoum, 3 and 4 September 2013

3 September 2013

In response to a kind invitation by H.E. Omer Hassan Ahmed al-Bashir, President of the Republic of the Sudan, H.E. Salva Kiir Mayardit, President of the Republic of South Sudan, paid an official visit to the Sudan accompanied by a high-level ministerial delegation during the period 3 and 4 September 2013.

The visit comes in the context of the summit diplomacy which has been taking place between the two Presidents to promote relations between the two countries and to achieve their mutual aspirations.

A number of meetings were carried out during the visit, including bilateral meetings between the Presidents in addition to meetings at the level of ministers and technical high officials. Extensive discussion took place embodying all the fields of relations between the two countries. The discussions were carried out in a positive environment with frankness and a strong political will which enabled the two sides to reach understandings, paving the way for the implementation of all cooperation agreements signed by the two countries, and the activation of the agreed joint committees, including the High-level Joint Committee and the Joint Implementation Committee.

In the same context, the parties confirmed the importance of supporting and facilitating the mission of the two mechanisms suggested by the Chairperson of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, President Thabo Mbeki, on 9 June 2013 regarding the identification of the zero line for the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone and the ceasing of support and harbouring of rebel movements, to enable the mechanisms to complete their mandate as scheduled, considering the vitality of their mandate for the provision of security at the borders and for the establishment of corridors that would allow the smooth movement of people, goods and oil, in addition to the cross-border movement of pastoralists.

The two sides also agreed to jointly address the international community, supported by the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, for debt relief for the Sudan and support for development in the two countries.

The two parties affirmed the importance of continuing their constructive dialogue for the resolving of the remaining pending issues including Abyei and the borders. They emphasized the necessity of reaching a speedy agreement on the establishment of civilian institutions in Abyei, to pave the way for the two Presidents to reach a final resolution for the issue. The two sides also agreed to facilitate the work of the African Union Team to resolve the disputed border areas issue, and to immediately demarcate the agreed border line.

During the visit a memorandum of understanding was signed by the Ministries of Foreign Affairs in the two countries.

A number of Employers Federation members and businessmen of the Republic of South Sudan accompanied the President of South Sudan during his visit, and a memorandum of understanding was signed for the establishment of a Joint Council for Businessmen in the two countries.

The two Presidents expressed hope that the outcome of the visit will present a strong push to the relations between the two countries, and in this context call on the civil society organizations and the media in the two countries to play a positive role in realizing the objectives of aspired stability for the benefit of the two peoples.

The two sides also expressed their gratitude for the support and encouragement of the regional and international community for the normalization of relations between the two countries, and in particular they appreciate the efforts of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, the Peace and Security Council and the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei.

**Security Council**

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5 September 2013
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Letter dated 5 September 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

With regard to the fourteenth report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004) (S/2013/467), which was submitted to the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, the Permanent Mission would like to make the following observations:

Although the report notes that the influence of Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities has risen in Syria, a development to which we have drawn attention repeatedly from the outset of the crisis in Syria, the Monitoring Team failed to make any mention of the savage acts of terrorism that have been committed in Syria by Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, the foremost of which is the Nusra Front. These crimes have targeted Syrian civilians and military personnel, Muslim and Christian religious leaders, hospitals, educational institutions, mosques and churches, civilian aircraft, diplomatic missions, factories, antiquities, museums and shrines. Moreover, the terrorist groups have even abducted and detained United Nations peacekeepers serving in the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force.

On behalf of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, the Permanent Mission has sent scores of letters to the Secretary-General and successive Presidents of the Security Council regarding the acts of terrorism and suicide bombings that have been perpetrated by terrorist groups in Syria over the past two years. Those letters have been circulated as documents of the Security Council and the General Assembly under the relevant agenda items, and we had hoped that the Monitoring Team would make reference to those acts of terrorism in its report.

The Monitoring Team, perhaps inadvertently, failed to mention that the number of terrorists in Syria who are affiliated with Al-Qaida has risen because certain States Members of the United Nations, the foremost of which are Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, are colluding with one another to support, arm, train, fund and dispatch transnational terrorists and foreign mercenaries who are fighting proxy wars in Syrian territory and targeting every component of Syria. Reports issued by intergovernmental organizations, including the United Nations, and non-governmental organizations have confirmed that specific States are involved in bringing and smuggling "fighters" and weapons into Syrian territory in order to fight Government forces.



The report also failed to note that the increased Al-Qaida presence in Syria is the result of the destructive role played by media organizations that are supported and sponsored by the Governments of certain States. These organizations are inciting terrorism, disseminating extremist ideology and promoting religious and sectarian chauvinism in order to heighten the crisis in Syria and the region.

It is regrettable that the United Nations has stood by impotently as extremism and terrorism continue to rise in Syria and the region with the blessing and support of certain States Members of the Organization. This rise has also been welcomed and supported by salafist, Wahhabi, takfirist and extremist organizations in States that claim to be at the forefront of the counter-terrorism effort and among the leading contributors to United Nations counter-terrorism funds and the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic affirms that those States that are arming, funding, training and providing safe havens for armed terrorists and facilitating their entry into Syria are partners in terrorism and complicit in the killing of Syrians. Their actions not only violate the principles of international law and Security Council resolutions concerning counter-terrorism, the most important of which are resolutions 1267 (1999), 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005) and 1989 (2011), but are also contrary to resolutions 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012) and the Geneva communiqué, all of which affirm the importance of arriving at a resolution to the Syrian crisis through a Syrian-led political process.

The Permanent Mission of the Syrian Arab Republic would be grateful if the present letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Bashar Ja'afari
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

**Security Council**

Distr.: General
9 September 2013
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Original: French

**Letter dated 4 September 2013 from the Permanent Representative
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council**

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to provide some clarification to the Security Council in order to correct the inaccurate information that has been circulating concerning the commander of the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism.

The Mechanism, which covers the Great Lakes Region, was established by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) in September 2012 to verify all allegations made by States members of the Conference, under the leadership of Brigadier General Geoffrey Muheesi Baraba, a Ugandan national.

Following repeated acts of gross misconduct committed by General Muheesi Baraba during his time in office, the Democratic Republic of the Congo recused him, but did not declare him *persona non grata*, at a meeting of ministers of defence of the States members of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, on the margins of the Summit of Heads of State of the Conference, held in Nairobi on 31 July 2013.

It should be noted that the Mechanism continues to operate normally under the command of a colonel from the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville). Under his supervision, the Mechanism recently visited Munigi and Goma (Democratic Republic of the Congo), as well as Rwanda, to conduct investigations.

For ease of reference, I wish to refer the Council to the enclosed note, in which the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Alexandre Luba Ntambo, presented that recusal to his counterparts (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) **Ignace Gata Mavita**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex to the letter dated 4 September 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Bias of the commander of the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism

I. Introduction

Since the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism was established in September 2012, its commander, Brigadier General Geoffrey Muheesi Baraba, a Ugandan national, has continued to commit acts of gross misconduct and to show bias in favour of the 23 March Movement (M23) rebels. This attitude has always been on display at internal Mechanism meetings and at meetings of chiefs of defence staff of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, as well as at public meetings involving the Mechanism, M23 and other armed groups.

II. Evidence

(a) On 20 November 2012, at the meeting of chiefs of defence staff of the Conference, held in Kampala, the commander of the Mechanism made the following disparaging remarks:

“M23 is better organized than the Forces armées de la République démocratique du Congo (FARDC) in terms of military prowess and discipline; 70 per cent of FARDC elements do not qualify as soldiers; the other 30 per cent, who are poorly trained, could be retrained. In the field, the FARDC commanders are very absent-minded and are fixated on Rwanda, which they say they want to attack, even though they are incapable of defeating the armed groups”;

(b) When the M23 rebels took control of the town of Goma in November 2012, the commander opted to include a member of the Mechanism representing the Democratic Republic of the Congo in a team assigned to a mission in Kisoro (Uganda) and Bunagana, even though all members had agreed that the Mechanism should focus its efforts on addressing all the activities (pillaging, massacres and rape) carried out by M23. That decision prompted a series of verbal altercations between the commander and a representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the Mechanism;

(c) On 26 November 2012, while M23 was in control of Goma, the commander of the Mechanism praised the M23 commander, Colonel Sultani Makenga, at Hotel Karibu, by saying: “Congratulations! You did a good job.” He did so in the presence of other members of the Mechanism, with the exception of the representatives of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The members were surprised by his remarks. For the commander of the Mechanism, the fall of Goma was a good thing that he welcomed. He had praised Col. Makenga in like manner, but using different language, following the defeat of Mr. Runiga’s faction upon the split of M23;

(d) On 25 June 2013, while travelling to the Mai Mai Shetani region, Brig. General Muheesi told a representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on the Mechanism that: “Your enemy is not M23, but the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR). Attack FDLR first, and M23 would of course lay down its weapons.” (Such language is also found in M23’s manifesto.)

He also commended the bravery of Innocent Kaina and Yusuf Mboneza, commanders of M23 units deployed along the Kibati-Munigi road, near Goma, noting that they were well versed in guerrilla tactics and that they could defeat any force that attacked M23;

(e) He paid scant attention to the return to Rumangabo of some soldiers from Runiga's faction who had been exiled in Rwanda following their defeat. On the contrary, at a meeting of the Mechanism, held on 24 April 2013, he said: "These are M23 elements whose leader, Bosco Ntaganda, is at The Hague; this return is no surprise because they are Congolese nationals returning home and no verification is warranted." At that time, he had allowed the Rwandan media to show just how far Runiga's fighters were in the Gikongoro region (Rwanda), in an attempt to cover up the situation;

(f) On 26 June 2013, following contacts between the Mechanism and Mai Mai Shetani groups, he said that M23 was a very well-organized movement that could even capture the entire eastern portion of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

(g) During a visit on 13 July 2013 to the Bundibudjo resettlement site in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the commander of the Mechanism went so far as to address the leadership of the Uganda People's Defence Forces battalion deployed to secure the borders, in order to encourage Ugandan troops to attack the Forces démocratiques alliées in the territory of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, if the threat comes closer to the border, and to do so even without the consent of the authorities of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;

(h) On 28 July 2013, at a meeting of chiefs of defence staff, held in Nairobi, the commander insinuated that FARDC was collaborating with the Mai Mai Nyatura and that he had never heard of any confrontation between FLDR and FARDC. He also played down the operational capability of FARDC to dislodge M23 from the hills of Kibati;

(i) He showed bias by paying scant attention to and failing to punish Rwandan officers who had demonstrated a lack of discipline by refusing to go on verification missions for inadequate reasons;

(j) Moreover, whenever faced with reprehensible acts committed by Rwanda, such as the unusual and unconventional deployment of Rwanda Defence Force troops close to the border of the Democratic Republic of the Congo — which ultimately amounted to direct support for M23 — Brigadier General Muheesi Baraba has always taken the position that such actions are meant to protect the territorial integrity of Rwanda against the threats of FDLR, even though the areas used by this negative force are controlled by M23. However, he has never regarded the deployment of FARDC forces in Goma and its environs as an effort to protect the territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Instead, he sees it as a breach of the Declaration of the Heads of State and Government of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region of 24 November 2012 concerning the deployment of a single battalion in Goma;

(k) On 20 May 2013, the commander said that the verbal threats made by M23 officer Innocent Kaina to take hostage two members of the Mechanism, one representing the Democratic Republic of the Congo and another representing Tanzania, should not be dealt with, but rather covered up and downplayed;

(l) Whenever the Mechanism met with M23 in zones under that group's control, the commander of the Mechanism has always taken time to meet briefly in private with M23 leaders before the meeting with all Mechanism representatives;

(m) He also holds private meetings with Rwandan representatives before the meeting with all members of the Mechanism, whose positions and conclusions have already been made public;

(n) He demonstrated a lack of authority by failing to obtain the release of two reports critical of Rwanda that were being withheld by the Rwandan team out of overzealousness and lack of consideration for other members of the Mechanism. The reports in question were the one pertaining to the pillaging of the town of Goma by M23, and the one concerning the meeting between the Mechanism and Janvier Karairi, head of the Mai Mai group known as the Alliance des patriotes pour un Congo libre et souverain.

III. Conclusion

It is clear from the picture painted above that the Brigadier General engaged in gross misconduct and committed several errors in his leadership of a regional military body of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region that is supposed to be impartial in order to rebuild mutual trust between States. For that, we recuse him.

(Signed) Alexandre Luba Ntambo
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence



Security Council

Distr.: General
27 August 2013

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the deputy representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received a letter dated 27 August 2013 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations stating that Mr. Peter Wilson has been appointed deputy representative of the United Kingdom on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, this letter constitutes adequate provisional credentials.





Security Council

Distr.: General
6 September 2013

Original: English

Letter dated 5 September 2013 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to inform you that in consultation with the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities, and the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1988 (2011), and taking into account the requirements stated in relevant resolutions, I have appointed Ms. Justyna Gudzowska (United States of America) to serve as an expert on the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004).

Ms. Gudzowska will succeed Mr. Brian C. Wilson (United States of America), who tendered his resignation on 11 July 2013.

I should be grateful if you would bring this information to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) BAN Ki-moon



**Security Council**

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6 September 2013
English
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Identical letters dated 6 September 2013 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I wish to draw your attention to the following information:

Saudi Arabian officials have persistently been making fateful public statements on the Syrian issue. They have expressed support for the armed terrorist groups, encouraging them to continue their criminal activities. Indeed, they openly admit to arming what they call "the opposition". As one example among many, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia said in Cairo on 1 September 2013 that his country had sent weapons to the Syrian opposition, and that that was no secret. On 24 February 2012, in Tunisia, that same minister had made the fateful statement that arming the Syrian opposition was an excellent idea. The Saudi Arabian intelligence services, represented by Bandar bin Sultan, the head of Saudi Arabian intelligence, and his brother Salman bin Sultan, the Deputy Minister of Defence, have supervised a secret operations room to train mercenaries and terrorists in northern Jordan on the Syrian border. They have also provided weapons to terrorist groups on Syrian territory. As is universally known, Saudi Arabian officials have recently announced that they have sent 400 tons of weapons to their terrorist proxies in Syria.

The provision of weapons and support to armed groups in Syria is a matter of the utmost gravity. The groups that Saudi Arabia boasts of arming include highly radicalized and fanatical extremists linked to Al-Qaida-led terrorist organizations. One of them is Al-Nusrah Front, which has been added to the sanctions list maintained by the Security Council Committee concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities.

The world has not forgotten the destructive role that Saudi Arabia played in siring, developing, funding, sponsoring and disseminating terrorist, extremist and takfirist ideology, from the tragic consequences of which the world continues to suffer. On the other hand, it is more than certain that Wahhabi and terrorist Saudi Arabians have played a role in the killing of Syrians, because the Saudi Arabian leadership actually boasts about it, including in its public statements. This means that it is a State that sponsors terrorism.

These destructive actions of Saudi Arabia that are publicly acknowledged by its officials undermine all efforts aimed at arriving at a political solution to the



situation in Syria and convening a second Geneva conference. They also violate, without question, the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law. These actions furthermore clearly violate the Security Council resolutions concerning counter-terrorism, including resolutions 1267 (1999), 1373 (2001), 1540 (2004), 1624 (2005) and 1989 (2011), as well as resolutions 2042 (2012) and 2043 (2012) concerning Syria, both of which affirm the need to arrive at a Syrian-led political solution to the situation in Syria.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic requests the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the Security Council to shoulder their responsibilities with a view to taking all appropriate measures to halt the terrorism of the Saudi family against Syria and other States around the world. This requires the Organization to take steps to halt these actions and violations and to hold the perpetrators accountable.

I should be grateful if this letter could be circulated to the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of the Council.

(Signed) Bashar Ja'afari
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Security Council

Distr.: General
6 September 2013

Original: English

Letter dated 6 September 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Uganda addressed to the President of the Security Council

On behalf of my Government, in its capacity as Chair of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, I have the honour to transmit a Declaration dated 5 September 2013, issued following the seventh Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region on the security situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Richard Nduhura
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Annex to the letter dated 6 September 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Uganda addressed to the President of the Security Council

Declaration of the Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Member States of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region on the Security Situation in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo

Seventh Extraordinary Summit of the Heads of State and Government

Kampala, Uganda

5 September 2013

Preamble

We, Heads of State and Government of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, meeting in Kampala, on 5 September 2013 at the invitation of Mr. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda and Chairman of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region Summit, to discuss the worsening security situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo,

Recalling the decisions made during our Extraordinary Summit, held in Nairobi on 31 July 2013,

Gravely concerned about the resumption of hostilities in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the worsening security and humanitarian crisis that has resulted in continued deaths of civilians, displacement and suffering of populations,

Further concerned that this new escalation of hostilities is an obstacle to the implementation of the Nairobi Extraordinary Summit Declaration of 31 July 2013, and a threat to regional peace and security,

Having received reports from the Meetings of the Committee of Ministers of Defence and the Regional Interministerial Committee on the security situation in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular recommendations on addressing the renewed fighting and the consequent security and humanitarian crises,

Welcoming and fully supporting other ongoing international efforts to address the crisis in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, in particular the United Nations Framework for Peace, Security and Cooperation for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region, signed in Addis Ababa on 24 February 2013, and Security Council resolution 2098 (2013), adopted on 28 March 2013, and reaffirming our support for the mandate of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region,

Reiterating our relentless commitment to find lasting solutions to the prolonged security crisis in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo in the spirit of the Pact on Security, Stability and Development,

Reaffirming our support to the ongoing Dialogue in Kampala, Uganda, between the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and M23, mediated by the current Chairman of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region in line with the decisions we made at our Extraordinary Summit held here in Kampala on 24 November 2012,

Commending the untiring efforts by President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, Chairman of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region Summit, in the search for a lasting solution to the security and humanitarian crisis in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and encouraging him to continue his efforts,

Hereby decide as follows:

1. Strongly condemn the recent bombings in Munigi and Goma in the Democratic Republic of the Congo that have resulted in the death of a senior United Nations officer attached to the Intervention Brigade, hundreds of civilians as well as the injury of United Nations military officers and civilians, and task the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism to undertake immediate investigations and provide the report thereon to the Committee of Ministers of Defence of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region as soon as possible;
2. Strongly condemn the recent bombings from Democratic Republic of the Congo territory that have resulted in the deaths of civilians in the territory of Rwanda and direct the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism to complete the verification process and provide a report to the Chairperson of the Committee of Ministers of Defence as soon as possible;
3. Direct that the Kampala Dialogue resume within three days after this Extraordinary Summit and conclude within a maximum period of 14 days during which maximum restraint must be exercised on the ground to allow for talks to conclude. The Chairman will keep in touch with his colleagues on the progress of the Dialogue;
4. M23 should put an end to all military activities, and stop war and threats of overthrowing the lawful Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;
5. Commit to continue exerting pressure together with our partners, in particular the Intervention Brigade, on the M23 and all other negative forces in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo to ensure they stop war;
6. Accept the request by the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) to have permanent representation in the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism, and appeal to MONUSCO to provide logistical support to the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism to enable it to carry out its mandate effectively;
7. Direct the Committee of Ministers of Defence to develop guidelines for legal and diplomatic protection of officers of International Conference on the Great Lakes Region mechanisms in line with international standards and develop a code of conduct for officers serving in such stations;
8. Direct the Executive Secretary to fast-track the release of the funds donated to the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism by the European Union through the African Union and commit to honour our financial obligations to the Expanded Joint Verification Mechanism;
9. Express strong concern about the ongoing humanitarian crisis exacerbated by the recent fighting in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and call on the international community to provide urgent humanitarian assistance, including food, medicine, tents, etc.;

10. Request the United Nations system to urgently find a definitive solution to the former M23 combatants interned in eastern Rwanda since March 2013;

11. Accept the proposal by the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Summit held in Lilongwe on 17 and 18 August 2013 on convening a joint SADC-International Conference on the Great Lakes Region Summit on the Great Lakes Region and direct the Executive Secretary of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to liaise with the SADC Executive Secretary to organize the Summit.

Done in Kampala, Uganda, 5 September 2013.

José Eduardo dos Santos
President of the Republic of Angola

Michel Djotodia
President of the Central African Republic

Joseph Kabila Kabange
President of the Democratic Republic
of Congo

Paul Kagame
President of the Republic of Rwanda

Salva Kiir Mayardit
President of the Republic of South Sudan

Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete
President of the United Republic
of Tanzania

Pierre Nkurunziza
President of the Republic of Burundi

Denis Sassou-Nguesso
President of the Republic of Congo

Uhuru Kenyatta
President of the Republic of Kenya

Omar Hassan Ahmed El-Bashir
President of the Republic of the Sudan

Yoweri Kaguta Museveni
President of the Republic of Uganda

Michael Chilufya Sata
President of the Republic of Zambia

**General Assembly
Security Council**Distr.: General
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**General Assembly
Sixty-seventh session
Agenda item 38
The situation in Afghanistan****Security Council
Sixty-eighth year****The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for
international peace and security****Report of the Secretary-General****I. Introduction**

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 67/16 and Security Council resolution 2096 (2013), in which the Council requested me to report on developments in Afghanistan every three months.
2. The report provides an update on the activities of the United Nations in Afghanistan, including significant humanitarian, development and human rights efforts, since my previous report of 13 June 2013 (A/67/889-S/2013/350). It also provides a summary of key political and security developments and regional and international events relating to Afghanistan.

II. Relevant developments**A. Political developments**

3. The reporting period saw significant positive momentum in preparation for the 2014 elections, even as steps towards a peace process faced difficulties. My Deputy, Jan Eliasson, visited Kabul and Kandahar from 28 June to 2 July 2013, where he engaged with Government, political stakeholders and civil society, including women's rights activists. On 3 July, one year after agreement on the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework (see A/66/867-S/2012/532, annex II), a Senior Officials Meeting in Kabul brought together representatives of the international community and the Government of Afghanistan to assess the status of commitments and further focus efforts moving forward. With transition processes to culminate next year, the situation remained characterized by uncertainty, but efforts have generally proceeded as planned.



4. On 18 June, representatives of the Taliban and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Qatar announced the opening of the Political Office of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan in Doha. A press release by the Taliban stated that the Office would "support a political solution" for Afghanistan's future and that the movement would not allow "Afghan territory to threaten other countries' security". However, the Taliban's use of the name and symbols of its former regime during the ceremony triggered a strongly negative reaction by the Government of Afghanistan and wider society. The Government has long insisted that any office be an address for authorized Taliban representatives to talk with the High Peace Council and not imply or legitimize a government in exile. There was further consternation at the Taliban statement's emphasis on establishing relations with third countries and international organizations, noting dialogue with Afghan authorities only at an unspecified, later date. On 19 June, the Government declared that dialogue would be postponed pending guarantees that the process would be fully Afghan-led. On 24 June, the National Security Council was informed that the contested signboard and flag had been removed by officials in Doha. The Taliban subsequently announced that the Office would temporarily close. Its future remains uncertain, with a spokesperson for Afghanistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs stating, on 12 August, that the Government was ready to establish dialogue with Taliban representatives in either Saudi Arabia or Turkey.

5. The joint secretariat of the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Programme reported that, as at 24 August, 7,220 former insurgents had joined the Programme, with 160 line ministry projects and 164 small grants completed or in progress. Separately, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) continued to support the Afghan People's Dialogue on Peace. Between April and June, 100 focus group discussions — of 200 planned in total — were conducted across the country involving 1,733 Afghans, including 429 women. The second phase of the initiative aims to develop provincial road maps for peace, drawing on the recommendations of participants. Entrenched impunity, pervasive corruption and abuse of authority, unemployment and, in some cases, lack of equitable development were highlighted as reasons for discontent and the insurgency. Concerns were voiced about the Afghan Peace and Reintegration Programme and what was seen as a lack of vetting and accountability.

6. In response to events in Doha, on 19 June President Hâmid Karzai suspended high-level negotiations on the Bilateral Security Agreement with the United States of America. A number of Afghan political stakeholders, including parliamentary and opposition leaders, opposed the decision, arguing that it could lead to the international community's withdrawing entirely at this critical juncture. On 14 July, the President's spokesperson confirmed plans to hold a national jirga to consult on the Agreement. The Cooperation Council of Political Parties and Coalitions of Afghanistan has rejected such a jirga, should it purport to have any legal authority, as unconstitutional and politically divisive. Concern has been expressed that the gathering could be turned to other purposes, including seeking to delay the 2014 elections or change the Constitution. On 22 July, while visiting Kabul, the United States Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, urged that the stalled Agreement be finalized by October. On 21 August, Afghanistan's National Security Adviser and head of the Security Transition Commission was named, together with the Foreign Minister, to lead a new phase in strategic engagement on this issue. On 24 August, President Karzai stated that if the current Government

could not reach agreement with the United States, then the latter would have to negotiate with the future Government.

7. Key legislation was agreed ahead of the 2014 presidential and provincial council elections. The Law on the Structure and Duties of the Independent Election Commission and the Independent Electoral Complaints Commission (the "structure law") and the electoral law were endorsed by President Karzai on 17 and 20 July, respectively, immediately after they were passed by the National Assembly. The new laws retained the Independent Electoral Complaints Commission and made it a permanent body for adjudicating electoral disputes. The single non-transferable voting system, with all candidates for representative bodies standing as individuals in multi-member provincial contests, was also maintained. After heated debate, the 10-seat quota for the nomadic Kuchi community was kept, although there will now be seven regional zones rather than a national constituency. Reserved seats for women representatives were reduced, with Provincial Councils now having a 20 per cent quota — down from 25 per cent.

8. The consultative process for appointing commissioners to the two electoral management bodies set forth in the new structure law was swiftly implemented. On 28 July, the selection committee, composed of the Chairpersons of the two houses of the National Assembly, the heads of the Independent Commission for Oversight of the Implementation of the Constitution and the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, together with the Chief Justice, presented the President with a shortlist of 27 nominees, drawn from over 200 applicants. Regrettably, civil society organizations related to elections failed to come to agreement and had no official representative in the selection process for the Independent Election Commission, as required by the new law. On 30 July, the President announced his final nine choices, who were sworn in the following day. The new members are broadly representative of Afghanistan's regional and ethnic diversity; three of the nine are women and two of the men have previously served as Commissioners. On 3 August, the new appointees elected Ahmad Yusuf Nuristani, a former governor of Herat, as Chair and, on 5 August, the President endorsed the reappointment of the Chief Electoral Officer. On 24 August, the process for selection of the Independent Electoral Complaints Commission got under way.

9. Technical preparations for the election have proceeded as planned. On 27 July, the second phase of the voter registration top-up exercise commenced at the district level. Limited to newly eligible or returned voters, as of 21 August, 435,775 new voters' cards were issued, 96,924 of which were to women. There have not been significant security incidents directly related to the process to date, but four districts proved inaccessible for security reasons, while centres in five other districts have yet to open amid logistical and staffing issues. The issuance of electronic national identity cards, which can also be used as a form of voter identification, is on hold pending passage of the Law on Registration and Population Records. On 31 July, the Commission approved its operational plan for the 2014 elections and, on 27 August, endorsed the United Nations electoral support project, ELECT II (Enhancing Legal and Electoral Capacity for Tomorrow, second phase). Negotiations are ongoing between the Commission and the Ministry of Finance to ensure that a greater proportion of the US\$ 129 million election financing is delivered through national budget processes.

10. Security for the conduct of elections is a major source of concern. On 29 July, the Ministry of the Interior provided the Independent Election Commission with its initial security threat assessment, estimating that 6,586 of 6,845 polling centres proposed by the Commission could be secured (3,435 assessed as secure, 945 low-threat, 1,074 medium-threat, 1,132 high-threat). Given child protection concerns, the Chief Electoral Officer agreed to discuss with Afghan security agencies the inclusion of a school impact assessment within the ongoing security assessment of potential polling stations. On 13 August, the former Chair of the Election Commission, Fazel Ahmad Manawi, stated in the media his belief that security officials were being unrealistic and had exaggerated preparedness for elections. The following day, the new Chair, Ahmad Yusuf Nuristani, responded that there were many challenges, but he believed that security forces were capable of addressing them.

11. Political activity among Afghan stakeholders gained pace ahead of the candidate nomination period, which runs from 16 September to 6 October. Intra- and inter-party alliances remain fluid, with multiple overlapping efforts to build broad-based alliances. Jamiat-e Islami, a predominantly Tajik party, appeared to put aside plans for a party Congress, with a 30 June internal reshuffle in which the interim party head, Salahuddin Rabbani, was retitled acting party head, and the Governor of Balkh, Atta Mohammad Noor, named Chief Executive. On 16 August, spokespersons for the historically, mainly Pashtun Hezb-e Islami (Afghanistan) and predominantly Hazara Hezb-e Wahdat faction led by Vice-President Karim Khalili told the media that an electoral alliance was planned. The Cooperation Council of Political Parties and Coalitions of Afghanistan continued to emphasize the necessity of timely elections. In the predominantly Pashtun South, there have been, however, a number of gatherings demanding the postponement or replacement of elections with other solutions or mechanisms owing to the security situation. On 1 August, the Governor of Kandahar was reported to have said that, given military drawdown in 2014, it was not the right time for elections and the President's term should instead be extended. The Taliban, in a statement purportedly by Taliban leader Mullah Omar to mark Eid al-Fitr, derided the upcoming polls as a "waste of time", highlighting allegations of fraud and corruption in previous elections. Reportedly, the Taliban plan a campaign to discourage election participation.

12. On 22 July, in the lower house of the National Assembly, or Wolesi Jirga, the Minister of the Interior, Ghulam Mujtaba Patang, lost a vote of interpellation after a majority of members rejected his answers to questions on the security situation. President Karzai has since sought an opinion from the Supreme Court on the legal basis of the vote and has named Mr. Patang as Acting Minister.

13. There were a number of changes to provincial governors. On 1 July, Kunar's Governor was transferred to Herat Province, which has been the site of intense rivalry between local powerbrokers. The same day, Farah's provincial governor was appointed Acting Minister of Tribal and Border Affairs. In Takhar Province, tensions between Uzbek and Tajik factions saw large-scale protests triggering the 15 July replacement of the provincial governor. That was seen to revive alliances between the predominantly Uzbek Junbesh-e Milli and Hezb-e Islami (Afghanistan) parties, at the expense of Jamiat-e Islami. In Jawzjan Province, ongoing intra-party tensions in Junbesh-e Milli saw protests and the 20 July replacement of the Governor.

B. Security developments

14. While overshadowed by events in Doha, the final tranche of the transfer of security responsibilities to Afghan security forces was announced on 18 June. A milestone event, this signified Afghan institutions' assumption of full responsibility for security of the country over the summer. On the occasion, President Karzai appealed to the international community "to equip Afghan forces according to the region's realities and according to existing security threats". The Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), General Joseph Dunford, publicly emphasized that a post-2014 support presence would be essential to the sustainability of efforts.

15. As at 29 July, there were approximately 183,000 Afghan National Army personnel (against a goal of 187,000 personnel) and 6,700 Afghan Air Force personnel (with a target of 8,000). Of these, some 630 are female, including one general and about 100 working with the Special Forces to address gender sensitivities during night raid operations. The United Nations-administered Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan supported 139,631 police as of June, against a target of 157,000. Of these, 1,974 are women. Efforts to continue strengthening the capabilities of Afghan security forces continue, although there remains a notable shortage of logistical capacity, air support and medevac, as well as of assets to counter improvised explosive devices.

16. With Afghan security forces conducting most operations, the number of casualties they endure has risen considerably. During the second quarter of 2013, over 3,500 Afghan service personnel were reportedly wounded or killed in action. On 1 July, the Ministry of the Interior reported that 299 police officers were killed in the Afghan month of Jawza (mid-May to mid-June), a 22 per cent increase over the same period in 2012. Large-scale unauthorized absences, in the army in particular, remain an issue. Attrition, from all causes, is as high as 2.4 per cent per month. "Insider attacks" also continued. Between 16 May and 15 August, there were two incidents against the international military — in Kandahar and Paktika Provinces — for which the Taliban took responsibility, and five attacks involving Afghan forces in Herat, Helmand and Kunar.

17. In the context of reshaping the Afghan National Police from a security force to a law enforcement and community policing service, on 25 June the Minister of the Interior convened Afghanistan's first Community Policing Conference to discuss how to strengthen the relationship between the police and the community. A new Justice and Rule of Law Trust Fund for Afghanistan is planned for early 2014. The Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan will be housed under the fund to support an integrated justice and rule of law approach.

18. Separately, the expansion of the Afghan Local Police programme continued. As at 14 August, the total number of personnel stood at 23,550. Initially focused on the north and north-east of the country, the major expansion is now in the south-east, with Nimroz, Panjshir, Samangan and Nuristan the only provinces without the programme. The Afghan Local Police has borne an increasingly disproportionate brunt of attacks by anti-Government elements. At the same time, in spite of continued efforts, there continues to be concern at a lack of vetting and accountability mechanisms, with reports of serious abuses and intimidation levelled against the Afghan Local Police.

19. The United Nations continued to monitor security-related incidents relevant to the work, mobility and safety of civilian actors, particularly those events that affect the delivery of activities and programmes mandated by the United Nations. No respite was evident during the holy month of Ramadan. From 16 May to 15 August, 5,922 incidents were recorded, an 11 per cent increase compared with the same period in 2012 (5,317 incidents), while still a 21 per cent decrease from 2011 (7,482 incidents). Tactically, armed clashes and improvised explosive devices constituted the majority of events (4,534 of the total). There has also been an insurgent focus on attacking security checkpoints and bases handed over to Afghan forces by the international military. Generally effective resistance by Afghan security forces focused on protecting key urban and district administrative centres as well as strategic transport routes.

20. Geographically, the southern, south-eastern and eastern provinces continued to account for the bulk of the security incidents — 69 per cent between 16 May and 15 August. Sangin district in Helmand Province remained one of the most contested areas in the country. The Wardoj district of Badakhshan Province remained fragile following armed clashes earlier in the year. On 28 June, foreign elements were reportedly involved and directly engaged in a clash between anti-Government elements and the Afghanistan National Border Police. Road transport in the district has been impacted, reducing access to four border districts. Across the North, the Al-Qaida-linked Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan is reported to have developed a field presence in several provinces.

21. Anti-Government elements conducted a number of “spectacular” attacks in urban areas. Between 16 May and 15 August, there were 33 suicide incidents, of which 7 occurred in the heavily protected capital, compared to 7 for all of 2012 and 16 in 2011. On 2 July, a truck bomb, aimed at a logistics base contracted by the international military near the largest United Nations facility in Afghanistan, killed six people and is believed to have used the largest explosive charge to date in Kabul. On 3 August, in Jalalabad, the Consulate of India was the subject of a complex suicide attack, in which all casualties were Afghan security personnel and civilians.

22. The United Nations, its implementing partners and other humanitarian entities came under a variety of direct and collateral attacks. On 22 June, in Farah City, a homemade improvised explosive device targeted a United Nations compound, although no casualties or damage were reported. On 1 August, a UNAMA vehicle travelling to Taloqan (Takhar Province) came under small arms fire as it evaded an illegal checkpoint. The United Nations was made aware of specific threats against agencies in Kunduz, Herat, Gardez, Khost, Jalalabad and Kabul, with staff temporarily withdrawn from premises in several cases.

C. Regional cooperation

23. New Governments in the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan presented opportunities for Afghanistan to build on and consolidate relationships with those neighbours. On 26 and 27 August, President Karzai undertook an official visit to Islamabad, emphasizing that for both countries the “primary concern” was lack of security and the menace of terrorism. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif stated Pakistan’s “strong and sincere support for peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan” and emphasized a policy of cooperative relations with all neighbours as vital to stable

external relations and a focus on domestic priorities. A number of economic and connectivity projects were also agreed.

24. On 4 August, President Karzai attended the inauguration in Tehran of Hassan Rouhani as President of the Islamic Republic of Iran. During the visit, a memorandum of understanding on strategic cooperation between the National Security Council of Afghanistan and the Supreme National Security Council of the Islamic Republic of Iran was signed. Areas of mutual interest include intelligence sharing in combating security threats such as terrorism, narcotics and organized crime. On 1 August, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan and the United Arab Emirates signed a long-term strategic partnership agreement and agreements on security cooperation and the transfer of prisoners.

25. On 7 July, Afghanistan became the fifty-fourth member of the Energy Charter Treaty. On 9 July, progress was made on the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline project with a contract signed in Ashgabat between Afghanistan and Turkmenistan on the sale and purchase of gas. On 13 July, in Kyrgyzstan, a meeting of the Foreign Ministers' Council of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization reaffirmed support to Afghanistan as an "independent, peaceful, neutral and prosperous State free from terrorism and drug-related crime". The central role of the United Nations in international efforts to improve the situation in Afghanistan was also reiterated. Under the Istanbul Process, regional technical groups on all six agreed confidence-building measures held meetings. The political value of regional experts and diplomats coming together to discuss these issues in six countries is in itself a significant achievement.

26. At the invitation of the Government of Pakistan, I visited Islamabad from 12 to 14 August and met with the President, Prime Minister and senior officials. I expressed appreciation for the ongoing hospitality that Pakistan has extended to Afghan refugees and was assured by the new administration of its intention to cooperate with Afghanistan. My Special Representative accompanied me on this visit and also represented me at President Rouhani's inauguration in Tehran, where, in a series of bilateral meetings, members of the new Iranian administration emphasized a desire for constructive engagement with the international community on issues of mutual interest, including Afghanistan. My Special Representative undertook a number of other regional visits as part of the UNAMA mandate of regional outreach, including to Moscow, Beijing, New Delhi and Dushanbe. In all capitals, enhanced commitment to bilateral and regional engagement in support of Afghan-led processes of elections and peace and reconciliation, as well as development and economic issues, was underscored. The interconnected nature of the challenges was recognized, with considerations for post-2014 Afghanistan focused on the need for a successful transfer of political authority through elections and peace and reconciliation efforts, amid fears of the impact of the increasing mobility of extremist groups, the readiness of national security forces, and rising narcotics production and trafficking.

III. Human rights

27. On 15 June, President Karzai appointed five new members of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, while four commissioners were retained on the nine-person body, including the Chair, Sima Simar. The Chair, civil society,

several donors and the United Nations expressed concern regarding the appointment process and eligibility of the new members. On 28 June, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights confirmed these concerns in a public statement. The Senior Officials Meeting on 3 July noted commitment by the Government of Afghanistan to maintain the integrity of the Commission and to ensure retention of the Commission's "A" status in the upcoming international accreditation process by the International Coordinating Committee of National Human Rights Institutions, which could also impact future international financial support to the Commission and more broadly.

28. Released on 31 July, the UNAMA Mid-Year Report 2013 on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict documented 3,852 civilian casualties (1,319 deaths and 2,533 injuries). That marked a 14 per cent rise in civilian deaths and a 28 per cent increase in civilian injuries compared to the first six months of 2012, with civilian casualties up 23 per cent overall. In the first half of 2013, civilian casualties were on a par with those of 2011, reversing the decline recorded in 2012. Of civilian deaths and injuries, 74 per cent were attributed to anti-Government elements, 9 per cent to pro-Government forces, and 12 per cent to ground engagements between the parties. Improvised explosive devices used by anti-Government elements continued to be the leading cause of civilian deaths and injuries. Increased ground engagements, now the second major cause of casualties, are increasing the threat to civilians. Women accounted for 106 of those killed and 247 of those injured, up 61 per cent compared to the first half of 2012. Children comprised 231 of the dead and 529 of the injured, a 30 per cent increase. A statement on the Taliban's official website dismissed the findings as biased and reiterated its stance that civilian Government employees and those perceived to support the Government were legitimate targets, in continuing, direct violation of international humanitarian law.

29. Accidents caused by explosive remnants of war in areas vacated by international forces represent a rising trend in deaths and injuries attributed to pro-Government forces. That resulted in 29 deaths and 37 injuries in the reporting period, in many cases the result of children searching for scrap metal. The United Nations has engaged with ISAF, which is working with its contributors in reviewing procedures.

30. The Country Task Force on Monitoring and Reporting on Children and Armed Conflict, led by the United Nations, documented 78 deaths and a further 195 injuries of children in 58 verified incidents between 1 May and 31 July. When discussing Afghanistan's progress on the Action Plan on Underage Recruitment, the Government highlighted progress in army and police recruitment practices and areas for improvement. The United Nations welcomed progress to date but emphasized the need for continued efforts in preventing the recruitment and use of children in Afghan security forces, particularly the police and the Afghan Local Police. On 10 August, the Office of my Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) undertook a joint mission to Kabul to support the Government's facilitation of the implementation of the Action Plan, including the development of a road map to compliance. On 14 August, the Inter-Ministerial Steering Committee met, with the United Nations in attendance, to discuss the road map and emphasized the great importance it placed on implementation of the Action Plan and removal from my list of parties that recruit or use children.

31. In monitoring implementation of Presidential Decree No. 129 on preventing abuse of conflict-related detainees, UNAMA visited 55 detention facilities in 19 provinces. Interviews were conducted with 144 adults, and 26 children were arrested on conflict-related charges. Credible and reliable incidents of torture and ill-treatment were found in five National Directorate of Security and six Afghan National Police detention facilities. On 10 July, UNAMA conducted its first visit to the detention facility in Parwan, which was transferred to Government of Afghanistan control in March, with 2,440 detainees currently being held. The facility's director advised that 2,330 detainees had been released since the handover, following case reviews. Another 70 detainees remain under the control of United States forces.

32. On 10 July, the Government submitted Afghanistan's first progress report on implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. On 28 July, the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women responded, recognizing the progress in Afghanistan over the past decade. The continued low level of women's participation in major national decision-making processes was, however, noted, with only nine women belonging to the 70-member High Peace Council. Concern was expressed over the recent reduction in quotas for women in local elected bodies and lack of participation in the judiciary, including the Supreme Court.

33. In a troubling development in ensuring Constitutional commitments to gender equality, on 20 June the Wolesi Jirga passed a new Criminal Procedure Code which bars the questioning of relatives of the accused and stipulates that upon the withdrawal of a victim's complaint, the case is closed. This may disproportionately affect cases of domestic violence where witnesses are usually family members and there is great pressure on victims to rescind. The bill has been submitted to the Meshrano Jirga for consideration. On 2 July, the Court of Appeal overturned a sentence of 10 years' imprisonment for attempted murder against three relatives of a young woman severely tortured in 2010 in a case that had captured global attention. The perpetrators were instead sentenced to three months in jail for bodily harm and, having already served more than a year, were immediately released. This decision is the subject of an appeal to the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, UNAMA monitoring reveals that the number of women and girls prosecuted for moral crimes has risen despite the Supreme Court and the Office of the Attorney General having issued three directives stating that running away from home is not a crime. It appears that criminalization of the act still occurs, or that prosecutors use charges of attempted adultery instead, with 450 women and girls imprisoned in 2012 and 600 so far in 2013.

34. UNAMA and the United Nations system in Afghanistan have worked to increase awareness of the Security Council resolutions on women, peace and security. Civil society workshops were organized in Mazar-e Sharif, Herat, two in Nangarhar, Bamiyan and Kabul.

IV. Implementation of the Kabul process and coordination of development assistance

35. On 29 June, the Government's national priority programme "Law and Justice for All" was endorsed, meaning that 21 of 22 programmes are now agreed. Given recent large-scale insurgent attacks on judicial institutions, the programme recognizes that the security of judges and prosecutors will require reinforcement.

36. The Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework Senior Officials' Meeting in Kabul on 3 July was co-chaired by the Ministers of Finance and for Foreign Affairs and my Special Representative. It was attended by delegations from 40 countries and eight international organizations, together with Afghan senior officials and civil society representatives. Plenary sessions discussed elections and aid-effectiveness, while working groups focused on human rights; rule of law and governance; and integrity in public finance, subnational governance and sustained and inclusive growth. It was noted that both the Government and the international community had made progress in meeting their commitments, but that greater efforts were needed on outstanding issues. The Minister of Finance reiterated the need for the international community to recognize Afghan ownership and leadership through a focus on institution-building and cost-effectiveness.
37. There was also discussion on economic growth and infrastructure development, highlighting achievements in public finance management and regional cooperation. Revenue growth over the past decade was welcomed as a significant achievement. The World Bank presented an economic forecast that estimated Afghanistan's real gross domestic product growth as 11.8 per cent in 2012/13, up from 7.3 per cent in 2011/12. This was, however, expected to slow in 2013/14 and fall to an average of 4.8 per cent annually over the next five years, with the overall economic scenario remaining challenging. Exports have declined against rising imports, leading to widening trade deficits. Revenue generation dropped by 19.6 per cent in the first quarter of 2013, although measures by the Government have slowed it to 3.9 per cent in the second quarter. The Government's ability to manage public finance was reported to have improved, with budget execution at 50 per cent compared to 39 per cent in 2010/11, but further progress would be required to sustain donor funding.
38. To ensure ongoing momentum, mechanisms of high-level dialogue between the Government and the international community that were established in the lead-up to the Senior Officials Meeting will continue. The strategic Steering Committee and working-level Technical Committee have been augmented by monthly Ministerial and ambassadorial-level meetings of the five plus three (the five major donors together with three rotating members) and weekly heads of donor agency gatherings. Three technical groups — on planning, national priority programme implementation, and elimination of violence against women and human rights — will also support further progress. The Government has also continued to engage donor partners in the implementation of its Aid Management Policy, including on-budget financing, development framework agreements, financing agreements, and joint analysis, research and assessments. The discussion is seeking to promote joint understanding on an aid-effectiveness agenda and consensus on definitions of "on budget" and "alignment".
39. On 7 July, the Independent Directorate of Local Governance, together with the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, finalized policy and terms of reference for the establishment of District Coordination Councils. These are intended to be in place until such time as constitutionally-mandated District Council elections take place. Provincial committees would determine membership based on Government criteria. The proposal has been submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval, with UNAMA facilitating consultations between the Government and the international community on funding modalities.

40. On 8 July, the United Nations launched the Afghanistan Integrity Initiative to support the Government in meeting anti-corruption priorities. It aims to provide an analytical foundation for a whole-of-Government approach, including simplifying administrative processes and ensuring that systems report and redress maladministration, misconduct and corruption. The Government's Transparency and Accountability national priority programme remains the only one yet to be endorsed. The Standing Committee of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board noted progress on two of the four donor redlines, namely, ratification of the access to information law and streamlining of building permits in the Kabul Municipality, while verification of public officials' assets and the financial audit regime lagged.

V. Humanitarian assistance

41. The legal authorization of nearly 1.6 million Afghan refugees to remain in Pakistan was due to expire on 30 June. On 28 June, following an extraordinary consultation meeting in Kabul between the Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan and the United Nations, the Government of Pakistan extended the proof of registration cards for refugees and the Tripartite Agreement on Voluntary Repatriation until 31 December 2015. That allows more time to create conducive conditions — through the Regional Solutions Strategy for Afghan Refugees — for the sustainable reintegration of Afghan refugee returnees, key to enhancing voluntary repatriation and reducing the potential for secondary displacement or return to the host country. At the meeting, the Government of Pakistan presented its new national policy on Afghan refugees, based on the approach of the Solutions Strategy. In implementing the agreed pillars — voluntary repatriation, sustainable reintegration in Afghanistan and support for refugee-hosting communities — the new policy stresses the need for political and diplomatic strategies, promotion of technical education and livelihood skills, a public information media campaign, and new bodies at federal and provincial level. All of this requires continuous international support. A total of 26,000 refugees voluntarily returned to Afghanistan between 1 January and 30 June from both Pakistan and the Islamic Republic of Iran, a 35 per cent decrease over 2012.

42. Increased ground engagements in Afghanistan have resulted in growing short-term displacements in rural areas, notably in Badakhshan, Faryab and Ghor Provinces, many of which remain inaccessible to humanitarian actors. As at 31 July, 584,000 persons (91,000 families) have been internally displaced owing to conflict in the country, 64,000 of them in 2013.

43. As at 15 August, 3 cases of wild polio virus were reported, compared to 15 in the same period in 2012. All three were in the eastern region with deteriorating accessibility and continuing virus circulation in the bordering districts of Pakistan. The southern region, which had never previously succeeded in interrupting virus transmission, has not reported any cases since November 2012. The number of children missed by the vaccination campaign owing to inaccessibility in the south has been reduced by almost 30 per cent, with an increasing acceptance among all parties of the value of polio vaccination. A statement purportedly by Mullah Mohammad Omar published on the official Taliban website to mark the occasion of Eid al-Fitr allowed organizations working impartially in the health, refugee or food distribution sectors in areas under Taliban control to carry out "selfless activities" subject to compliance with conditions.

44. The mine action sector, supported by the United Nations, cleared 306 minefields in 137 communities in the reporting period. On 3 July, the Governor of Badakhshan and the United Nations hosted an event where 10 districts were declared completely free of mines and explosive remnants of war. It is estimated that 4,730 minefields affecting 1,655 communities across 33 provinces remain. The first six months' work on a 10-year plan to clear all hazards by March 2023 has proceeded on target. Estimated to cost \$618 million, by the end of July \$66 million had been committed.

45. On 3 August, the first of a number of flash floods hit the centre and south-east of the country. As at 15 August, it was estimated that 65 persons had been killed and 53 injured, while others remained missing. Overall, 759 families were affected, 550 of them in Kabul Province. Meanwhile, drought conditions in Ghor and Daikundi Provinces are expected to result in the failure of much of the harvest. A United Nations assessment in July recommended the provision of food aid, seeds and fodder. Initial estimates foresee that, from the month of October, up to 135,000 persons may require support.

VI. Counter-narcotics

46. On 26 June, the *World Drug Report 2013* was launched. It highlighted that Afghanistan had accounted for 74 per cent of the world's illicit opium production in 2012. The global area under poppy cultivation rose by 15 per cent in 2012, driven largely by increases in Afghanistan. Global production, however, fell by almost 30 per cent, mainly as a result of poor yields in Afghanistan owing to adverse weather conditions. The report further assessed that nearly 1 million Afghans were affected by drug use — one of the world's highest levels of addiction — with only 10 per cent receiving any form of treatment.

47. An early assessment for 2013 estimated an increase in opium cultivation in 12 provinces. Governor-led eradication activities in the reporting period aimed to reduce production figures. As at 13 July, up to 8,262 hectares of opium poppy were estimated to have been eradicated. In undertaking this effort, 132 lives have been lost and 89 persons injured.

48. Between 30 June and 3 July, a regional training on anti-money-laundering, illegal financial flows and suspect cash transactions was held in Tehran and brought together senior experts from Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. On 3 July, the Islamic Republic of Iran hosted the Seventh Regional Financial Intelligence Unit meeting to enhance regional cooperation in tackling money-laundering and suspicious financial transactions. The aim is to facilitate a common instrument to improve information exchange of suspicious transactions, including to tackle the profits of drug trafficking.

49. Efforts continued under the United Nations-led Regional Programme for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries, with the Second Regional Workshop on Drug Collection and Analysis Capacities held in Islamabad from 1 to 4 July. Participants from the eight Regional Programme countries as well as Sri Lanka, Maldives, Nepal and Bangladesh shared information on drug use and experiences with drug-use surveys. The first task force meeting of the Subprogramme on Trends and Impacts of the Regional Programme took place at the end of the Workshop. This

highlighted that the cultural sensitivities and stigma attached to drug use are a major challenge to interview-based surveys in the region. On 27 and 28 August, the fourth meeting of the Regional Intelligence Working Group on Precursor Control was held in Tehran, bringing together law enforcement officers working on precursor control and interdiction from West and Central Asia. Participants shared information on the status of precursor control, including the latest seizures of controlled substances.

50. Under the Triangular Initiative, a series of meetings were held in Kabul between 19 and 21 August with senior officials of Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan working to deepen counter-narcotics cooperation. Joint operations, border liaison offices, communications and the exchange of information were discussed.

VII. Mission support

51. After the 18.7 per cent reduction in funding for UNAMA in 2013, there is a need to avoid further large-scale organizational change in 2014 that would impact further UNAMA field presence and activities. Increased efficiencies have been achieved through focus on multitasking, reprofiling of posts and outsourcing. The UNAMA regional jet, which provided regular flights between Kabul and Dubai, was decommissioned.

52. Reducing its footprint as the transition process proceeds and in the light of budget constraints and security issues, UNAMA will close the Khost Provincial Office in October. It is also proposed that the UNAMA Bamyan Regional Office be reprofiled as a multi-agency office by the beginning of 2014, focusing engagement in this largely peaceful province increasingly on development issues. Pending budget approval, as of January 2014, there will be 13 field offices, down from a total of 23 in 2012. In Kunduz, no premises have yet been found for the office, which must be relocated or closed for security reasons. UNAMA has developed memorandums of understanding with the United Nations Development Programme in Mazar-e Sharif, Kandahar and Gardez on cost-sharing and additional reductions of operational costs in terms of security, ancillary staff and rental payments.

53. The Kuwait Joint Support Office continued to integrate support for UNAMA and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). The Under-Secretary-General for Field Support, Ameerah Haq, visited the Office in July and witnessed the implementation of the Global Field Support Strategy in such inter-mission cooperation initiatives. The Office has commenced a staffing review to analyse the efficiencies associated with transferring human resources and finance functions to Kuwait.

VIII. Observations

54. The visit of my Deputy underlined the long-term commitment of the United Nations to assisting Afghan authorities and people to realize their aspirations of peace, justice and development. The dominant theme my Deputy heard was the need to protect the gains of the past decade. The significance of the upcoming elections and the need for reconciliation to ensure the success of transition and the country's long-term prospects were clear. He heard widespread calls for the United Nations

role in support of these Afghan-led political processes. The need for long-term predictability in international assistance as part of mutual commitments made at the Chicago Summit and in Tokyo was also underscored.

55. Effective, representative institutions are the foundation of stable transition processes. The 2014 Presidential elections, and the extent to which they are conducted inclusively, will be the surest basis of internal legitimacy. They will mark the first peaceful, democratic transfer of power in Afghanistan and will be central to ongoing international commitment. I welcome the adoption of electoral legislation. A sound legal framework confirming the independence of the Independent Election Commission and the Independent Electoral Complaints Commission represents the foundation for a robust electoral architecture and mutually agreed rules by which the forthcoming vote can be contested. The new commissioners have a great responsibility in their country's future. Operational, including security, planning is further advanced than during previous elections, and I welcome the clear Afghan lead showing that Afghanistan — its people, institutions, political and social forces — is indeed responsible for the 2014-2015 electoral cycle. Final agreement on funding modalities is now essential to ensure that resource mobilization proceeds smoothly.

56. I have taken note of the legitimate concerns raised by the Afghan authorities and society, as well as the international community, regarding the manner in which the Taliban office in Doha was opened. Any talks should be inclusive and should be accompanied by early confidence-building steps aimed at reducing levels of violence, notably around the elections and the increased safety and security of Afghan civilians who have suffered the effects of the conflict for too long. The forthcoming Presidential elections and current discussion among Afghan stakeholders on building a national consensus are likely to clarify candidates' positions, including on the peace process and on how to achieve reconciliation without compromising the gains of the past 12 years. The United Nations supports an inclusive Afghan-led and Afghan-owned peace process and I would encourage all efforts that ensure it starts soon.

57. The Senior Officials Meeting was an important opportunity to review progress under the Tokyo Mutual Accountability Framework and to confirm the need for active high-level engagement in accelerating efforts to meet commitments. Ensuring international commitments to the provision of assistance in ways that use and reinforce Afghan institutions and budgetary systems is a crucial element of transition. Confidence in the capabilities of Afghan governance and financial management systems is, in turn, essential. Increased internal revenue generation and the passage of the anti-money-laundering law are important in this regard. As Afghanistan's transition progresses, donors will continue to stress the importance of sustaining progress on human rights, including women's rights, to ensure the best developmental results for the Afghan people, as well as to maintain the commitment of donors' domestic constituents. Greater progress on implementation of the Law on the Elimination of Violence against Women will continue to be a clear priority, as will efforts to ensure retention of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission's "A" status in the upcoming international accreditation process.

58. The launch of the fifth and final stage of the security transition during the current quarter, with Afghan security forces to be in the lead across the country, confirmed the resolve of ISAF to end its operations next year. Afghan security forces have demonstrated increased capabilities and determination in assuming their

security responsibilities, while gaps and deficiencies are exposed with increased clarity. Security remains problematic in a number of mostly rural areas, including in the north of the country. A rise in civilian casualties — bringing deaths and injuries back to the highest levels documented post-2001 — is of concern. Insurgents continue to target civilian Government officials and civil servants. I call on all parties to respect civilians and to meet international obligations.

59. Disturbances and conflict are not all attributable to the Taliban, Al-Qaida-affiliated transnational terrorist groups, and other anti-Government armed groups. At such times of volatility and unpredictability, organized criminal groups involved in narcotics trafficking and a proliferation of illegal armed groups seek to assert influence. It is also for this reason that the successful transfer of political authority through Presidential elections as well as continuity and predictability in long-term international support for Afghanistan are critical to ensuring that there will be no impression of a security or governance vacuum.

60. I was heartened by the productive discussions of President Karzai with Prime Minister Sharif in Islamabad. The extension of the visit by one day demonstrated the very welcome readiness of both sides to work together on issues of common interest. This corresponds with the conclusions of my own visit to Pakistan, with the new Prime Minister's emphasis on improving neighbourly relations. The recent extension allowing Afghan refugees to stay in Pakistan amid continuing efforts to ensure sustainable solutions for returnees is highly appreciated. Constructive engagement by regional countries and cooperation between them is essential to building and reinforcing long-term stability. The Istanbul Process, in which Afghanistan plays a key role, is an important component of this. We encourage all lead countries on confidence-building measures to ensure that practical activities are under way by the end of 2013. I welcome China's offer to host the Ministerial meeting of the Istanbul Process next summer as recognition of the importance of regional solutions.

61. The United Nations partnership with a sovereign Afghanistan will continue to evolve in support of Afghan priorities and Afghan needs. As Afghan institutions assume a stronger lead, I recognize that the United Nations role must increasingly turn from service delivery to strengthening Afghan capacity and resilience and a support role to Afghan-led processes. I welcome strengthened coordination between the Government and the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes in advancing a "One United Nations" agenda. This will better align our activities with national priorities, including through efforts to reduce programmatic and financial transaction costs, to address the "second civil service", and to work in ways that do not risk the United Nations being seen as competing with Government for service delivery and international funds.

62. The 2013 Common Humanitarian Action Plan is currently around 63 per cent funded, a positive reverse on recent years that have seen a decline in humanitarian funding. I welcome the recommendations of the Humanitarian Coordinator to establish a Common Humanitarian Fund, which — in addition to generating new funding — will channel more resources to underfunded humanitarian actors, including Afghan non-governmental organizations that serve as the mainstay of response in the country. Increased displacement owing to conflict, especially in remote areas, is of concern. Efforts must be made to put in place mechanisms to

ensure that those displaced can find safe havens and access humanitarian assistance. I call on all parties to work to increase access in areas of ongoing conflict.

63. I would like to express my gratitude to all national and international staff members of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and to my Special Representative, Ján Kubiš, for their continued dedication, often under challenging conditions, to fulfilling our commitments in support of the people of Afghanistan.



Security Council

Distr.: General
9 September 2013

Original: English

Letter dated 6 September 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to inform you that the Security Council is scheduled to hold a high-level meeting on the subject "Small arms: the impact of the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons on international peace and security" on Thursday, 26 September 2013. A concept note, prepared to inform the discussion, is attached (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Gary Quinlan
Permanent Representative



Annex to the letter dated 6 September 2013 from the Permanent Representative of Australia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Security Council high-level meeting on small arms: the impact of the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons on international peace and security

26 September 2013

Concept note

Australia will convene a high-level meeting of the Security Council on small arms, focusing on the impact of the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons on international peace and security. This meeting will build on the renewed international momentum and focus on small arms and light weapons and allow a timely discussion of the Secretary-General's latest report (S/2013/503) on small arms. It has been five years since the Council last considered this threat in a dedicated way,¹ despite the cross-cutting nature of small arms across the Council's agenda. This meeting will be an opportunity to consider practical steps to strengthen and give best effect to Council responses to small arms and light weapons-related threats to international peace and security. Council members will be invited to participate at the Head of State/Head of Government level. The Secretary-General is expected to brief, along with a small number of other high-level invitees. Australia proposes that the Council adopt a resolution on this issue.

Context

The illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons intensify and perpetuate conflict and instability around the world, including in the majority of the conflict situations on the Council's agenda. In many cases, these activities are in violation of Council resolutions, sanctions and embargoes, hinder the effective implementation of United Nations peacekeeping mandates, and threaten the lives of peacekeepers. The illicit use of small arms and light weapons is also integral to other threats to international peace and security, including terrorist acts, piracy and transnational organized crime.

The illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons threaten civilians (particularly women and children) in armed conflicts and hamper protection efforts. These activities feed cycles of violence, lead to serious violations of international humanitarian and human rights law, and sustain the viability of armed groups. Their humanitarian consequences are devastating. Their effects undermine State sovereignty, security, governance, the rule of law, development, health and education. The Secretary-General's report

¹ The Council first addressed small arms thematically with a dedicated open debate and presidential statement in 1999. In all, it has adopted six presidential statements on the topic: S/PRST/1999/28, S/PRST/2001/21, S/PRST/2002/30, S/PRST/2004/1, S/PRST/2005/7 and S/PRST/2007/24. The Council held its last open debate on small arms in 2008 upon the issuance of the Secretary-General's report S/2008/258.

(S/2013/503) makes clear the persistent and evolving nature of this threat and the need for integrated responses by the Council.

The Council has recognized that the destabilizing accumulation and illicit manufacture, trade and circulation of small arms and light weapons compromise its effectiveness in discharging its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,² and has responded in a range of ways:

Country situations. The illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons have contributed to, and prolonged and intensified instability and conflict in, the majority of the Council's country situations. The Council's decision in March to strengthen the mandate of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) represents a clear and strong Council response to a situation aggravated by the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons.³

Regional situations. The illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons have destabilizing effects across regions, as we are seeing in the Sahel⁴ and in Central Africa.⁵ The Council has stressed the important role of regional and subregional organizations in addressing small arms and light weapons challenges. It has encouraged the establishment or strengthening of subregional or regional cooperation on illicit trade of small arms and light weapons across borders and also noted the need for the mandates of peacekeeping operations to take into account the regional instruments enabling States to identify and trace illegal small arms and light weapons.⁶

Sanctions and arms embargoes. The Council has in place 11 country-specific arms embargoes, 8 of which relate to countries that also have a peacekeeping or special political mission. The Council has also imposed targeted arms embargoes, including against Al-Qaida, Al-Shabaab and the Taliban, as a means of countering terrorism. Small arms and light weapons fall within the scope of these embargoes. The Council has a responsibility to ensure effective implementation of the embargoes it imposes, which it takes forward through its sanctions committees and associated groups of experts.

Peacekeeping. United Nations missions have an important role in addressing the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons. The Council has explicitly tasked peacekeeping operations, such as in Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia and Mali, to assist in addressing small arms and light weapons proliferation and trafficking, including through physical security measures, stockpile management and weapons collection and destruction.⁷ The illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons also threaten the lives of United Nations peacekeepers and hinder the ability of missions to implement their Council mandates effectively.

² See presidential statement S/PRST/2007/24.

³ See Security Council resolution 2098 (2013).

⁴ See presidential statements S/PRST/2013/10, S/PRST/2013/5, S/PRST/2012/26.

⁵ See presidential statement S/PRST/2010/6.

⁶ See presidential statement S/PRST/2013/12 and Security Council resolution 1631 (2005).

⁷ See resolutions 2112 (2013), 2101 (2013), 2100 (2013) and 2066 (2012).

Peacebuilding, including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform. The Council has noted that the destabilizing accumulation and illicit manufacture, trade and circulation of small arms and light weapons in many regions undermine the sustainability of peace agreements and impede the success of peacebuilding.⁸ By mandating peacekeeping and special political missions to support peacebuilding efforts, including disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform activities, the Council plays an important role in preventing future illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons. The Council has also recognized the important links between arms embargoes and post-conflict disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform.⁹

Protection of civilians. The Council has expressed grave concern about the effects of the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons and the use of such weapons on civilians affected by armed conflict. It has noted that excessive accumulation and the destabilizing effect of small arms and light weapons impede humanitarian assistance and can exacerbate and prolong conflicts, endanger civilians and undermine security and the confidence required for a return to peace and stability.¹⁰

Women and peace and security. The Council has recognized the link between gender-based violence and the illicit manufacture, transfer and circulation, excessive accumulation and uncontrolled spread of small arms and light weapons.¹¹ The Council has urged Member States and international and regional organizations to take further measures to improve women's participation during all stages of peace processes, particularly in conflict resolution, post-conflict planning and peacebuilding.¹²

Children and armed conflict. The Council has highlighted the links between children in armed conflict and the illicit trafficking of small arms and light weapons, reaffirmed its intention to take appropriate action through country-specific resolutions, and urged Member States to take action in accordance with the Programme of Action on Small Arms.¹³

Recent developments

Since the Council last considered this issue thematically in 2008, there have been important multilateral developments, including the consensus outcome of the second Small Arms Review Conference in 2012 and the adoption and opening for signature in 2013 of the Arms Trade Treaty. The Council has also taken action on a range of escalating crises fuelled by the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons (including in the Sahel) and established new arms embargoes (including for Libya), as well as new or strengthened peacekeeping operations (including in Mali).

⁸ See presidential statement S/PRST/2007/24.

⁹ See presidential statements 2007/3 and 2002/30.

¹⁰ See Security Council resolutions 1674 (2006) and 1894 (2009).

¹¹ See presidential statement 2010/6.

¹² See Security Council resolution 1889 (2009).

¹³ See Security Council resolutions 1612 (2005), 1539 (2004) and 1460 (2003).

Objective

The objective of this meeting is to support the existing normative framework and to consider practical steps to strengthen and give best effect to Council responses to small arms and light weapons-related threats to international peace and security. In this context, Council members may wish to consider the following issues in their statements:

- What more can the Council do to ensure effective implementation of sanctions and arms embargoes, particularly through the role of United Nations peacekeeping and special political missions? How can the Council improve coordination and cooperation between panels of experts/monitoring groups and United Nations missions and agencies in achieving this?
- Where the Council deploys peacekeeping or special political missions, how does it ensure the mission is equipped to address illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons, including in terms of the mission's mandate and composition (and in the context of supporting peacebuilding strategies and activities)? How can peacekeeping and special political missions better support activities such as physical security measures and stockpile management? How can United Nations missions and agencies in neighbouring countries improve coordination to manage illicit flows of small arms and light weapons?
- How can the Council better coordinate with the United Nations system, Member States and regional and subregional organizations in efforts to address illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons? What support can the broader United Nations system provide to ensure the effectiveness of the Council's response to small arms and light weapons challenges?
- How can the Council better ensure that efforts to address small arms and light weapons challenges incorporate civilian protection strategies and that efforts in the protection of civilians in armed conflict and post-conflict scenarios encompass relevant small arms and light weapons challenges? How can the Council better support the participation of women in planning and implementing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and security sector reform?

Australia proposes that during the high-level meeting, the Council adopt a resolution focusing on the impact of the illicit transfer, destabilizing accumulation and misuse of small arms and light weapons. Australia considers that a resolution is needed to reinforce Council efforts to meet its primary responsibility on this issue. The resolution would support the existing normative framework and articulate practical steps to strengthen and give best effect to Council responses to small arms and light weapons-related threats to international peace and security.

**General Assembly
Security Council**

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10 September 2013
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-seventh session
Agenda item 36
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-eighth year

**Identical letters dated 6 September 2013 from the Permanent
Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council**

On instructions from my Government, I wish to inform you of an incident that occurred on 25 August 2013 at around 1500 hours on the outskirts of Habbariyah town, in the locality of Rus in Saddanah, within Lebanese territory. While a civilian, Khudr Muhammad Nab'ah, was grazing his flock near point OP4, an Israeli enemy patrol attempted to abduct him. When he fled towards the town, the enemy patrol took 350 head of goats that belonged to him. At 2100 hours, the goats were returned to Lebanese territory.

My Government considers this action to be a blatant violation of my country's sovereignty, and it must be condemned on the basis of the principles and provisions of international law and international norms.

I should be grateful if you would circulate the present letter as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 36, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nawaf Salam
Ambassador
Permanent Representative





Security Council

Distr.: General
11 September 2013

Original: English

Letter dated 10 September 2013 from the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Pursuant to Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith resolution 7670, adopted by the Council of the League of Arab States at its meeting held in Cairo at the level of Ministers for Foreign Affairs at its 140th ordinary session, on 1 September 2013 (see annex). The resolution is entitled "Occupation by Iran of the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa, three Arab islands in the Arabian Gulf belonging to the United Arab Emirates".

I should be grateful if you arrange for the text of the present letter and its annex to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ahmed Fathalla
Ambassador



Annex to the letter dated 10 September 2013 from the Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

The occupation by Iran of the three Arab islands in the Arabian Gulf belonging to the United Arab Emirates: the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa

The Council of the League of Arab States at the ministerial level,

Having considered:

The note of the Secretariat,

The report on the activities of the Secretariat between sessions,

The recommendation of the Political Affairs Committee,

Guided by the previous Summit resolutions, the last of which was resolution 510 of the Sirte Summit (22nd ordinary session) dated 28 March 2010, concerning the occupation by Iran of three Arab islands in the Arabian Gulf, namely, the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa, which belong to the United Arab Emirates,

Reaffirming its earlier resolutions on the same matter, the most recent of which was resolution 7598 (139th ordinary session) of 6 March 2013,

Decides

1. To reaffirm without qualification the absolute sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates over its three islands of the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa and to support all peaceful measures and means adopted by the United Arab Emirates to regain its sovereignty over the occupied islands;
2. To denounce the continued consolidation by the Iranian Government of its occupation of the three islands and its violation of the sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates, which can only undermine security and stability in the region and pose a threat to international peace and security;
3. To condemn the building by the Iranian Government of housing facilities to settle Iranians on the three occupied islands of the United Arab Emirates;
4. To condemn the Iranian military manoeuvres being conducted also on the three occupied islands of the United Arab Emirates, namely, the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa, and in those islands' territorial waters, airspace, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone, which constitute an inseparable part of the United Arab Emirates; and to request that Iran desist from such violations and acts of provocation, which constitute interference in the internal affairs of an independent, sovereign State; do not promote confidence-building; threaten security and stability in the region; and endanger the security and safety of regional and international navigation in the Arabian Gulf;
5. To condemn the opening by Iran of two offices on the island of Abu Musa belonging to the United Arab Emirates and to call upon Iran to close down those illegitimate facilities and respect the sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates over its territory;

6. To denounce and condemn the planned fact-finding visit of the members of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee of the Iranian Consultative Assembly to the occupied islands belonging to the United Arab Emirates, namely the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa, an act that would violate the sovereignty of the United Arab Emirates over its territory and would be inconsistent with attempts to find a peaceful settlement; and to call upon Iran to desist from taking such provocative steps;

7. To commend the United Arab Emirates on its initiative to find a peaceful and just settlement to the issue of the three occupied islands (the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa) with the Islamic Republic of Iran;

8. To appeal once again to the Iranian Government to end its occupation of the three islands of the United Arab Emirates, refrain from trying to impose a fait accompli by force, desist from establishing any installations there for the purpose of modifying the islands' demographic structure, revoke all measures and remove all installations unilaterally executed by Iran on the three Arab islands, inasmuch as such measures and claims are null and void, lack any legal effect, do not detract from the established right of the United Arab Emirates over its three islands and are acts that run counter to the provisions of international law and the Geneva Conventions of 1949; and to call upon the Iranian Government to adopt peaceful means for resolving the existing dispute over them in accordance with the principles and norms of international law, including agreement to refer the matter to the International Court of Justice;

9. To express the hope that the Islamic Republic of Iran will reconsider its position of rejecting the effort to find a peaceful solution to the issue of the three occupied islands of the United Arab Emirates either through direct, earnest negotiations or through recourse to the International Court of Justice;

10. To call upon Iran to translate its stated desire for improved relations with the Arab countries and for dialogue and détente into concrete steps, both in word and in deed, in the form of a genuine response to the earnest appeals launched by His Highness Sheikh Khalifa Bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of the United Arab Emirates, and by the States members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab States, international groups, friendly nations and the Secretary-General of the United Nations, calling for a solution to the dispute over the three occupied islands by peaceful means in accordance with customary practice and the covenants and rules of international law, either through direct, earnest negotiations or through recourse to the International Court of Justice, with a view to building trust and enhancing security and stability in the Arabian Gulf region;

11. To have all Arab States undertake, in their contacts with Iran, to raise the issue of that country's occupation of the three islands in order to stress the need to end it, based on the fact that the three islands are occupied Arab territory;

12. To inform the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the Security Council of the importance of maintaining the issue on the list of matters of which the Security Council is seized until Iran ends its occupation of the three Arab islands and the United Arab Emirates regains its full sovereignty over them;

13. To request the Secretary-General of the League to follow up this matter and report to the Council at its next session.